Search Result(s)

Biden, like Trump is not even remotely progressive

Both represent an attempt to legitimize a global capture scheme that is being forced upon us to legitimate itself. Be aware that neither could fulfill promises to their constituents that they are making, because all that policy space was taken off the table in the case of policy on services, 80% of a modern economy, by GATS, in the 90s.

What is "Services Liberalization", and what does it mean for our way of life?

Bluntly, as they describe it, the high cost of labor in the developed countries is acting like a huge weight around corporations necks, forcing capital to invest in developing countries, not in us. What is really happening is the system has become less and less dependent on any one workforce. Increased profits are motivated by both greed and increased competition for jobs.


The trilemma of hyper-globalization.

Between centralization and fragmentation: the club model of multilateral cooperation and problems of democratic legitimacy

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Paper prepared for the American Political Science Convention, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 3, 2000. "Globalization can be defined as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances. Globalization as we understand it refers to processes–economic, military, environmental and social–that strengthen or “thicken” these networks" … (discussions of the legitimacy or lack of it. About the "democratic deficit" or "democracy deficit", and what they lack- Its also about the discussion of legitimacy and its own glaring problems)

Migration, Precarization and the Democratic Deficit in Global Governance

Migrants make up a disproportionate part of the social category whose experience in the world of work is marked by “precarity” in terms of informal labour, wage squeeze, temporariness, uncer- tainty and pernicious risk. They belong to the most disadvantaged among a globally growing workforce of casual labour which has come to be called the “precariat”. This, in spite of vast differences in local situations, is currently one of the greatest social and political challenges: to governments, to multilateral organizations, to trade unions and to broader social justice and human rights movements across the world. It is a predicament of the present that takes us well beyond the conventional understanding of North and South, West and East. “Precarity” has currently gained importance in critical labour and citizenship studies in general, and in studies on migration, in particular. Its coining is ascribed to Bourdieu (1963). It epitomizes the nexus of precarious labour and truncated citizenship (e.g. Vosko, 2009; Anderson, 2010; Goldring. 2011).Yet the meaning that precarity conveys in a range of contemporary critical studies is not “social exclusion”, seen as due to redeemable institutional shortcomings, but a “constitutive ele- ment of the new global disorder, to which it is very functional”. (Ricceri, 2011: 68). As such it represents an institutionally embedded hegemonic norm embodying market driven imperatives of “flexibility”, “availability”, “multilocality” and compressed “mobility” across time and space, with “the migrant” as its quintessential incarnation (Tsianos, 2007: 192). But “precarity” – together with its offshoot, the “precariat” – is, equally, adopted as a self-ascribed emblem by contemporary social movements questioning the premises of this very norm. Talking the talk of “precarity” has become regular parlance in political and scientific debates on and through labour and social justice movements concerned with the rights of migrants. There are indications that a global movement is afoot, speaking with or on behalf of millions of migrant “precarians”. This is part of the wider alter-globalization movement, which is developing in tandem with and at the same time contesting neoliberal globalization by emphasizing instead “human rights” and the participatory role of civil society in a democratized global governance of migration (Liki c-Brbori c and Schierup, 2012, [2010]).

Opposition in International Law – Alternativity and Revisibility as Elements of a Legitimacy Concept for Public International Law - by ISABELLE LEY

As international law is widening in regulatory scope and intensity, it arguably suffers from a legitimacy deficit. This article conceives of this deficit as a deficit in possibilities to politicize, criticize, and contest international law-making proposals in the way a loyal opposition does in a domestic constitutional context: through the representation of relevant societal interests, the voicing of critique, and the safeguarding of alternative proposals for the future. The author of this article tries to bring together the current debate in political theory on the value of legitimate disagreement and dissent in political institutions and the ongoing discussion on the legitimacy of international law. Therefore, a concept of an institutionalized opposition for international law-making processes is developed, referencing authors such as Hannah Arendt and Claude Lefort. Next, the author analyses whether one can already find instances of an institutionalized opposition in international law – in parliamentary assemblies and in international agreements which are designed to present a legal–political counterweight to specific legal concepts and institutions.